A family preference for sons over daughters may manifest itself in different ways, including higher mortality, worse health status, or lower educational attainment among girls. This study focuses on one measure of son preference in the developing world, namely the likelihood of continued childbearing given the gender composition of existing children in the family. The authors use an unusually large data set, covering 65 countries and approximately 5 million births. The analysis shows that son preference is apparent in many regions of the developing world and is particularly large in South Asia and in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region.
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Modernization does not appear to reduce son preference. For example, in South Asia son preference is larger for women with more education and is increasing over time. The explanation for these patterns appears to be that latent son preference in childbearing is more likely to manifest itself when fertility levels are low. As a result of son preference, girls tend to grow up with significantly more siblings than boys do, which may have implications for their wellbeing if there are quantity-quality trade-offs that result in fewer material and emotional resources allocated to children in larger families.
I.

Introduction
A family preference for sons over daughters may manifest itself in a variety of ways. An especially stark dimension is the excess mortality among girls which has been documented in several Asian countries (see for example Zeng et al 1993 for China; Muhiri and Preston 1991 for Bangladesh; and Das Gupta 1987 for India) . A similar phenomenon has also been documented in the Middle East (Yount 2001) . Son preference can also manifest itself through lower investments in the human capital of girls. Pande (2003) documents lower nutrition and lower immunization rates among girls in India. School enrollment among girls lags behind that of boys in many South Asian, Middle Eastern and North African countries (Filmer 2005) . 1 This study focuses on one particular definition of "preference" for sons, namely different propensities for continued childbearing given the gender composition of existing children in the family. Such behavior could be the result of taste-based gender discrimination, or economic factors such as differences in the costs of investing in girls versus boys, or differences in the pecuniary return to investments in girls versus boys. The paper does not, therefore, use the term "preference" only in the sense of inherent tastes but in the looser sense of gender-related differences in behavior-regardless of the cause of those differences.
There are numerous possible reasons for observing son preference in the developing world. Typically, these derive from conditions found in many traditional rural societies such as inheritance systems which pass assets to sons, inter-generational insurance systems in which sons care for parents in old-age, or production systems with low pecuniary returns to women's work (and to investments in women's human capital). General development processes and modernization, including urbanization, the dissolution of traditional rural communities, and increasing female education and labor force participation are expected to work against these pressures for son preference in settings where it exists (see for example Chung and Das Gupta 2007) . We explore whether there is such a son preference in fertility decisions in the developing world; how it varies across countries and regions; whether it is associated with measures of modernization such as urbanization, female education, and wealth; and the potential consequences of son preference in fertility decisions for household demographic composition and the investment in girls' human capital.
A handful of empirical studies have investigated how gender preferences in fertility decisions vary during the development process. Hank and Kohler (2000) focus on European countries. Using Fertility and Family Surveys from 17 countries, they find substantial heterogeneity across Europe, with a tendency towards a mild preference for a mixed sex composition. Their data suggest a girl preference in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Portugal. Andersson et al. (2006) use historical data from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to show no effect of gender on fertility for second births, a desire for gender balance at third births and heterogeneity across countries at fourth births (son preference in Finland and daughter preference in the other three countries).
In developing countries, most of the literature has focused on individual Asian countries with a prevalence of discrimination against women.
2 An important exception to these countryspecific studies is Arnold (1992 Arnold ( , 1997 , who considers the impact of sex-ratios on subsequent fertility behavior across many developing countries. Arnold (1992) shows that the most typical pattern in the 26 countries he studies is of a preference for at least one son and one daughter. He finds some weak evidence for son preference in North Africa and Sri Lanka. Arnold (1997) analyzes data from 44 countries, but largely focuses on the effect of sex ratios on stated fertility preferences and on some fertility behaviors such as current pregnancy status and average birth spacing. He finds regional variation in the extent of an association between sex ratios and the outcomes he analyzes, with the strongest results suggesting son-preference for the Asian and North African countries.
In this paper, we use information on 5 million births from 1.3 million mothers in 65 countries to analyze how the gender mix of children already born affects fertility decisions in the developing world. We extend the literature in a number of important ways. Our analysis includes a large number of developing countries from disparate regions. We document not only regional patterns in son-preferred differential stopping behavior, but also within-country differences by location (urban versus rural), education (women who have completed primary school versus those with less schooling), wealth levels (above and below the median of a composite measure of assets), and over time (by comparing different birth cohorts of mothers). We analyze the extent to which observed patterns in son-preferred differential stopping behavior strengthen or weaken as the total number of children decreases. And, finally, we link these results to the wider literature on gender composition and resource dissolution in larger families.
II. Methods and data
Estimating the impact of gender balance on fertility behavior
We begin our analysis by estimating the impact of gender balance of children on the probability of subsequent births. The basic model estimates:
where B wn+1 is a zero/one outcome variable indicating a birth at a pre-existing number of children n for woman w; M wn1 is a variable equal to one if the woman w had no male children at family size n and F wn is a variable equal to one if the woman w had no female children at n; the term o wn is a random error. We run this regression separately by parity. another birth if she has no sons than if she has no daughters. As in much of the literature (see Keyfitz (1968) and Repetto (1972) for early examples), we refer to this as son-preferred differential stopping behavior (or DSB). For shorthand, we often refer to this as "son preference", although it should be clear that we refer exclusively to fertility decisions, as described above, rather than to other possible manifestations of differential behavior toward sons and daughters post-birth, as might be evident in (for example) differences in mortality, 
, a test of the "differences in differences". A similar logic obviously applies to differences by education levels, and wealth.
To test for differences between women in urban and rural areas, we use a woman's reported current residential location. To test for differences by education, we divide the sample of women into those that have completed fewer than six years of schooling and those that have completed six or more. (Six years of schooling corresponds to completed primary school in most of the countries in our sample.) 3 The analysis by household wealth is based on a composite measure of household durable goods-see Filmer and Pritchett (2001) . 4 In each country the sample is divided by whether the household falls above or below the median household wealth scale.
We next focus on changes in differential stopping behavior across birth cohorts of women to investigate whether the DSB increases or decreases over time. To do this, within each country, we calculate the DSB for every one-year birth cohort-for example, women in India born in 1945-and then calculate the corresponding regional averages in each year-for example, the DSB for women in South Asia in 1945. We first graph these regional averages. As a more formal test of changes in DSB, we also run separate regressions, by region, of DSB on a set of 5-year birth cohort dummies, and test for differences in these dummies. One concern with these estimates is that any observed changes in DSB across birth cohorts could be driven by changes in the countries that form part of the regional averages-some countries only have surveys in earlier years, and therefore enter into the calculations of regional averages for early birth cohorts, while other countries only have surveys in later years, and only enter into the calculation of regional averages for the later cohorts. We therefore also presents estimates that keep fixed the countries in each regional sample, and keep fixed the weight that is given to each country to calculate the regional average.
In the concluding section of the analysis, we adopt a multivariate framework based on location-education-cohort cells. We do this primarily because, as we show, prevailing fertility rates have a significant effect on estimated DSB, and are correlated with other observable factors. The basic regression is then:
where ( 
Data
We use data from 159 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from the 65 countries listed in Table 1 . The DHS are particularly useful datasets for us as they cover a very large number of countries with a consistent questionnaire and survey methodology. In general, we weight observations in each survey by their expansion factors, which reflect differences in the probability that households are sampled in the DHS. 7 When constructing regional averages, we further re-weight observations so that each country contributes its relative population share to the regional sample; for this purpose, we use population estimates for the year 2000. 8 We present a series of robustness tests that show that our findings are largely similar regardless of whether we present the weighted or unweight regional averages.
ed
III. Effect of child gender composition on fertility behavior
Region and country differential stopping behavior: Table 2 presents the first set of results, by region. The first column reports the coefficient on b mn from Equation (1), while the second column reports the coefficient on b fn . The third column reports the difference between these two values, while the fourth column reports the p-value of this difference. The last two columns, finally, report the mean number of children and the mean of the ratio of the ideal number of male to female children, as reported by mothers to the survey enumerators. 9 For each region, the top row presents the averages across family sizes, while the next five rows present the individual coefficients for family sizes 2-5 (where, as before, a family size of 2 corresponds to women who have already had 2 children). Although the results from all family sizes are included in the averages, we only report the size-specific coefficients for sizes 2-5 because the results for higher numbers of children are very noisy, and represent less than 5 percent of the total number of births. The sample is limited to women age 40+, who are most likely to have completed their fertility.
In order to derive a Cambodia database, we pool the data from the two survey years and adjust the survey weights such that each survey contributes half of the weighted observations to the analysis. Pooling data across surveys allows us to increase the number of observations for each country and therefore increase the precision of our estimates.
The In addition, Table 2 shows that there is son preference, in the sense described above, in many regions in the developing world. This can be seen in the third column of the We next turn to the parity-specific results. Because it is hard to take in all of the coefficients at a glance, we summarize the parity-specific results in Figure 1 In addition to making apparent differences across cohorts in these basic patterns, Table 2 is informative about the extent to which the mother-reported "ideal" balance between the number of boys and girls is a good indication of actual fertility behavior. This can be seen by comparing the last two columns in the table. A clear subjective preference for sons is apparent in South Asia and MENA, as is a clear behavioral preference for sons. However, another region that exhibits a significant pattern of son-preferred stopping behavior, ECA, reports a subjective preference for the near equality of sons and daughters. In contrast, mothers in Sub-Saharan Africa report a subjective preference for sons, but families do not exhibit son preference in actual fertility behavior. In Latin America and the Caribbean, mothers express a slight preference for daughters, but actual fertility behavior exhibits no distinct pattern. Clearly, subjectively stated preferences over the gender composition of children more accurately predict actual fertility behavior in some regions than in others. it is most pronounced in Table 2 -MENA, ECA, and South Asia.
Differential stopping behavior by mothers' characteristics:
Given the strong son preference exhibited in some regions, we turn to now to an investigation of how these behaviors vary across oft-used measures of "modernization". Table 4 explores heterogeneity in DSB by place of residence, education, and wealth.
Although we report results for all regions, we focus our discussion primarily on ECA and South Asia, where son preference is largest in the aggregate results. The results in Table 4 suggest somewhat of a different pattern in these two regions. In both South Asia and ECA, there is son preference in urban and rural regions, among more and less educated women, and among households with more or less wealth. (These results can be seen in the third and seventh columns, labeled DSB.) However, the difference-in-difference results in the last column of the table suggest that in South Asia son preference is higher in urban than in rural areas (although not significantly so), higher among women with more education levels, and higher in households with more wealth. Some of these differences are quite large: For example, women with six or more years of schooling are 19 percentage points more likely to have an additional child if they do not have boys than if they do not have girls; the comparable number for women with less than six years of schooling suggest a much smaller difference, 7 percentage points. 12 In ECA, on the other hand, the picture is more mixed: Son preference is higher in urban than in rural areas (but not significantly so, like in South Asia), but higher among women with low levels of education than among those who have completed at least primary school (unlike South Asia). Further, there is no significant difference among households in ECA at different wealth levels.
It is often believed that, as societies and economies develop, the traditional social practices that may enforce or perpetuate a preference for sons will weaken. This could happen, for example, as women gain greater autonomy and control a greater share of the economic resources of the household (see, for example, the discussions in Haddad et al. (1997) ). Under this scenario, we might expect to see greater son preference in rural than in urban areas, among women with less education, and among poorer women. Table 4 makes clear that this is generally not so, in particular in those regions in which overall son preference is most pronounced.
Differential stopping behavior by mothers' birth cohort:
We next inspect changes across birth cohorts. For this purpose, we simply calculate DSB for each regional cohort cell as described above. Figure 2 summarizes this by presenting the five-year moving average of DSB, by region. In most regions, there is no systematic pattern. In South Asia, however, DSB appears to increase across birth cohorts, and is almost 15 percentage points higher for the latest birth cohorts as for the earliest ones. The other region with a high degree of son preference, ECA, presents first an increase and then a decrease in son-preference although the absolute levels remain high throughout.
12 Women who are educated or live in urban areas potentially have greater access to technologies that allow them to select the sex of a child. This might affect a small number of the women in our sample (those in the latest cohorts in some countries). However, the effect on estimated DSB is not clear since DSB is by definition a behavior conditional on the existing gender mix of children, regardless of whether the gender mix arose through natural means or with the assistance of sex-selective technology.
As a first pass to testing whether these changes across birth cohorts are significant, we regress DSB on a linear cohort trend, separately by region. Each observation is weighted by the number of women in that cohort-year cell, which gives greater weight to the more precisely calculated cell averages. The coefficient on the cohort trend in this regression for South Asia is highly significant (0.007, with a standard error of 0.002), which suggests that DSB has been increasing by about 0.7 percentage points for each successive cohort. The corresponding coefficient for Southeast Asia is also significant (0.005, with a standard error of 0.02). None of the other coefficients is close to standard levels of significance. Figure 2 , and the corresponding regression analysis described above, has two potential problems. The first of these is that a linear cohort trend may not do justice to the data; this is particularly apparent for the ECA due to its inverted U-shaped pattern. To address this concern we next turn to a regression of DSB on 5-year birth cohort dummies, again separately by region.
The results from these calculations are presented in the top panel of Table 5 where these coefficients are the regression analogue of the pattern observed in Figure 2 . Once again, the clearest pattern is apparent for South Asia, where DSB rises monotonically across five-year birth cohorts. The increase in DSB is almost tenfold, from 0.018 (for the cohort born in 1941-45) to 0.170 (for the cohort born in 1961-65).
The second, more difficult problem is that the regional averages for different birth cohorts may be driven by different countries, depending on the years in which they conducted DHS. For example, the data from Sri Lanka, where the only DHS was carried out in 1987, enters the average for South Asia for the early birth cohorts, but not the later ones, while Nepal, where DHS were carried out in 1996, 2001, and 2006 enters the regional averages for the later birth cohorts, but not earlier ones. In an attempt to address this concern, we limit the sample to countries that have a DHS both in 1995 or earlier and in 2000 or later. This substantially reduces the number of countries, from 65 to 27. However, for these countries we are able to calculate cohort-specific measures of DSB for women born in every year between 1945 and 1960. (The sample is limited to women age 40+, as before.) We can therefore calculate regional averages that keep the weights given to each country fixed across birth cohorts.
In the bottom panel of Table 5 , the sample of countries is kept fixed as is the weight that each country receives in the regional average. It still appears that DSB increases across birth cohorts in South Asia, although the pattern is much less dramatic, and the difference across cohorts is no longer significant. In other regions, the patterns are less clear and are generally not significant. What is clear is that there is no decline in son preference in any region where it exists over yet another standard measure of modernization -the passage of time.
A simple multivariate framework: The socio-demographic characteristics explored in Table 4 -mother's education, urban location, and household wealth-are of course correlated with one another and, in addition, they generally increase over time. Thus it is quite possible that the association between DSB and each of these characteristics is really driven by one main social indicator. Furthermore, prevailing fertility levels may have an effect on DSB since fewer families in a high-fertility environment are faced with differential stopping decisions due to the greater likelihood of a mixed gender composition at higher family sizes. We therefore next move to the multivariate framework given by Equation 4. Table 6 presents the results from regressions using this data set. In bivariate regressions, urban residence and higher educational attainment are both associated with higher DSB (although not significantly so). These results are in the first two columns of the table, and they are consistent with the results in Table 4 . In addition, however, column 3 shows that there is a significant negative association between the average number of children and DSB-the point estimate implies that a decrease of one child in family size more than offsets a switch from rural to urban location and almost offsets a switch from low to high schooling levels.
The main results in the table can be found in columns 4 and 5, which include the measures of location, education, and the mean number of children for a given country, year, location and education cell. Once the average number of children is included in the model, the association between DSB and urban residence, and between DSB and education, becomes negative (column 4 of table 6). This reverses the earlier (bivariate) findings and suggests that the higher son preference in urban areas and among more educated mothers can be "explained" by differences in overall fertility levels. 13 Including global dummy variables for each birth year, as a way of flexibly controlling for any secular changes over time, barely affects the results for these three indicators (column 5 of table 6).
In sum, the cell-level results suggest that the number of children women expect to have over their lifetimes is an important determinant of DSB. When fertility levels are high, the absence of boys in earlier births is not an important driver of childbearing decisions-at all but the highest parity levels, most couples expect to have more children, no matter what the sex composition of earlier births. However, as family size decreases, a higher fraction of couples find themselves having to choose whether to have an additional child at a point when they are close to their desired family size and all the children they have had to date are of the same gender. At this point, the gender composition of earlier children-in particular, whether there is at least one boy-appears to play an important role in their decision.
Gender differences in number of siblings:
If families are more likely to have an additional child when they have no sons than when they have no daughters, girls may grow up in households with more siblings than will boys. Of course, the number of siblings that boys or girls have will also be determined by mortality-which may vary with family size and by gender.
We explore differences in the mean number of siblings for girls and boys between the ages of 0 and 15 years, by region, in Table Table 7 will generally be underestimates of the differences in sibship size by gender that result from son-preferred DSB.
There is a very large literature which documents associations between larger family size and poorer outcomes for children in developed and developing countries (see, for example, Behrman and Wolfe 1982; Horton 1986; Conley and Glauber 2006 , and the references therein).
More siblings may result in dilution of household and parental resources, and to "quantityquality" tradeoffs. Estimating the causal effect of the number of siblings on child outcomes is difficult because of the likelihood of omitted family characteristics that may bias results.
Nevertheless, insofar as some of the association between the number of children and poor outcomes is causal, it suggests that son preference, as manifested in gender-specific differential 14 On India, see for example Das Gupta (1987) , Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) and Rose (1999) .
stopping behavior (DSB) may have adverse implications for the outcomes of girls, who will tend to grow up in larger families. Moreover, as Table 7 shows, the differences in family size by child gender are largest in those areas where girls are most likely to suffer from discrimination in other ways, in particular in South Asia.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the fertility response to the gender composition of children using data from 159 Demographic and Health Surveys carried out in 65 countries. Gender composition of earlier births is a significant determinant of subsequent fertility in many developing countries. We find fertility behavior consistent with son-preference in many regions of the developing world, with the clearest patterns apparent in South Asia and ECA. Specifically, the absence of sons increases the probability of an additional birth by significantly more than the absence of daughters. We refer to this phenomenon as son-preferred differential stopping behavior (DSB).
When we explore heterogeneity, we find that widely used measures of "modernization,"
including urbanization, higher education levels, and household wealth, are associated with an increase in son-preference, as captured in the DSB. The presumption that this manifestation of son preference will dissipate over time is also not supported by the data. The results from regressions using a simple multivariate framework suggest that this may be a result of reductions in family size. While it is possible that greater urbanization, female education and household wealth all reduce a latent son preference, the reductions in fertility that accompany modernization also make it more likely that a latent son-preference can be detected in behavior.
We conclude by showing that one implication of these patterns is that girls tend to have more siblings than boys. In and of itself, this is an important finding, as it likely has implications for the development of boys and girls in infancy, childhood, and adolescence. Moreover, insofar as there are "quantity-quality" tradeoffs that result in fewer material and emotional resources allocated to children in larger families, son preference in fertility decisions may have important indirect implications for investments and for the wellbeing of girls, relative to boys. 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 Mother's Birth Year DSB Table reports the estimated probability of an additional birth as a function of having no boys and no girls. Models are estimated at the region level and include country dummy variables. Family size 2+ estimates are weighted averages for family sizes 2 and greater (see text for details). The ratio is the mean desired number of boys divided by the mean desired number of girls. * (**) indicates significance at the 5(1) percent level. Note: Table reports the estimated probability of an additional birth as a function of having no boys and no girls. Models are estimated at the region level and include country dummy variables. Estimates are for family sizes 2 and up (see text for details). The ratio is the mean desired number of boys divided by the mean desired number of girls. * (**) indicates significance at the 5(1) percent level.
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